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Professor Richard Weisberg, Walter
FloersheimerProfessor of Constitutional
Law, Benjamin N. Cardozo School of
Lawtt
DR. FOGELMAN: Thank you, Thane.
I am honored to be chairing this distinguished panel on
"The Evolution and Objectives of the Holocaust Restitution Initiatives."
Elie Wiesel has said, "If all the money in all the Swiss banks
were turned over, it would not bring back the life of one child.
But the money is a symbol. It is part of the story. If you suppress
any part of the story, it comes back later with force and violence."'
I am not a lawyer, but as a psychologist I know very well that
restitution can be considered apart from its outcome. The mere
fact that lawyers, judges, politicians, historians, and community
leaders have gathered here today under the auspices of a university broadens the discussion.
I know you lawyer types speak about legal remedies, but in
my world we think about remedies that make a difference, in this
case in the well-being of Holocaust survivors and their heirs, and
the consequences in the post-Holocaust generation of the perpetrators.
When I work with Native Americans and African Americans,
they are envious of the validations that victims of Nazism have
gotten. For them it is not just a monetary reward, but the public
debates about how to compensate victims.
Psychologically speaking, victims need validation for their
suffering and their losses in order to begin a healing process.
This validation needs to come particularly from the perpetrators,
but also from the bystanders.
More than half a century later, the restitution initiatives
have provided an opportunity for survivors to be heard in ways
tt Richard Weisberg holds the Walter Florsheimer Chair in Constitutional Law at
the Benjamin N. Cardozo Law School of Yeshiva University. Professor Weisberg helped
to negotiate the recent agreement between the French and American governments, the
French banks, and the plaintiffs in the matters involving Vichy property confiscations.
Professor Weisberg has written extensively in the field of Law and Literature.
1. See Vivian Curran, Competing Frameworksfor Assessing Contemporay Holocaust-Era
Claims, 25 FORDHAM INT'L L.J. (Symposium issue) (2001).
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they were not heard before because the world was not ready two
and a half generations ago.
As survivors are aging and approaching their own imminent
death, mourning their losses and recalling their persecution
more than a half-century ago are at the forefront of their
thoughts, feelings, and nightmares-yes, they have returned.
The new restitution initiatives are enabling survivors to mourn
communally, to feel less isolated, and, as I said, to experience
some validation for their pain, suffering, and losses.
When needy survivors were applying for U.S.$500, one
rather successful Holocaust survivor was asked by the Committee
who knew him: "Mr. Cohen, how come you're applying for the
needy fund? You are not needy." Mr. Cohen replied: "I am very
needy. I am needy for justice."
For other survivors, the renewed initiatives of restitution are
psychologically demeaning, that survivors are being reduced to
Deutsche marks and Swiss francs at the end of their life. To
them it feels like blood money.
How do we get beyond the monetary issues of restitution?
Let's say that every country doubled the checks they were doling
out, but there was no acknowledgment, no sense of responsibility. Is that a valuable restitution outcome? And what is the right
balance between monetary negotiation and truth seeking, moral
responsibility, and justice? And in what form is the South African model of truth and reconciliation trials the answer?
Some of the questions we will be answering in our panel
today by our distinguished panelists will be: How do Holocaust
victims, the Jewish community, and the world seek restitution
long after the Holocaust? Do restitution efforts that focus exclusively on money miss other crucial objectives, such as the healing
process, reconciliation, and truth finding?
I would like to start our discussion with Count Otto Lambsdorff, who was the leading German negotiator for the Slave Labor Funds.
Count Lambsdorff, you have spent your life promoting German-U.S. relations, and your most-recent endeavor was quite
challenging. My understanding of Germany today is that some
Germans are obsessed with the Holocaust; others are asking:
"How much longer will we have to live under the stigma?" How
are the Germans reacting to the slave labor negotiations, and
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here I am talking about, as I see Germany today, four different
generations-the older generations who are still amongst us,
whether they were the perpetrators, the bystanders, or the resistors and rescuers; those who were children, coming of age during the Third Reich; the second generation, those born after the
Holocaust; and today the third generation. And who amongst
the Germans feels a moral responsibility for some justice towards
the victims?
DR. GRAF LAMBSDORFF: Thank you very much, Dr. Fogelman.
Ladies and gentlemen, let me first express my gratitude to
Professor Rosenbaum for having invited me. It is a great honor
to be here and to be a part of this important panel dealing with,
as we all know, a very important subject.
As our moderator has just explained, I have been asked by
Chancellor Schr6der to be his negotiator for talks leading to the
Foundation "Remembrance, Responsibility, and the Future."
You, Dr. Fogelman, have just asked how did the Germans
react to these efforts. It was very helpful for me that German
public opinion-the publicized opinion and the public opinion,
even the people in the street-reacted very positively. I got great
help and assistance for the efforts, which we undertook and for
the targets for which we negotiated.
Of course, I do not overlook, ladies and gentlemen, that
there are always people who either prefer to keep silent under
the given circumstances, who will not be as positive. I would not
claim that 100% of the Germans are ready to back what we did.
But the German public, as I said again, all political parties, the
government, newspapers, academics, were on our side, and that
was and is very helpful.
I have been asked today to make some remarks on the
moral and historical background of the efforts leading to the
Foundation "Remembrance, Responsibility and the Future."
The program of the Foundation finds its expression in its
name I just quoted: Remembrance, Responsibility, and the Future.
Remembering the Holocaust has been a major issue in German politics, especially again in the last decade. I think several
factors explain this renewed interest:
* a change of generation-you mentioned the generation
problem, Dr. Fogelman-both on the political scene and
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in the German business world permitted an easier and
less-biased approach to the past.
" after the fall of the Berlin Wall in 1989, opening our horizon to Eastern Europe and recognizing the atrocities
Germans committed during World War II,
" growing interest in the Jewish contribution to German science and culture in the nineteenth and the early twentieth centuries-and the newly opened Jewish Museum in
Berlin serves as an example-is playing an important role
in this debate.
Our German responsibility was summed up by President
Rau in front of survivors in December 1999 during the negotiations. I see Mr. Kagan, who was present on this occasion. I
quote President Rau:
We all know that no amount of money can really compensate
the victims of crime. We all know that the suffering inflicted
upon millions of women and men cannot be undone. I know
that for many survivors it is not really money that matters.
What they want is for their suffering to be recognized as suffering and for the injustice done to them to be named injustice. I pay tribute to all those who were subjected to forced or
slave labor under German rule and in the name of the German people beg forgiveness.
Ladies and gentlemen, Germany acknowledged responsibility not only two years ago. Let me go fifty years back, right after
the end of World War II.
The first steps of property restitution to Holocaust victims
were taken by the Allied powers after the surrender of Germany
in 1945. Right after the rebirth of West German political structures at the municipal and state level, Germans took over this
task.
The most important breakthrough was the Luxembourg
Agreement of 1952 between the Federal Republic of Germany,
the State of Israel, and the Claims Conference, making payments
available for Israel to facilitate the integration of settlers and for
the Claims Conference to assist Holocaust survivors outside of
Israel.
At the same time, the young West German State pledged
comprehensive restitution and compensation legislation. Under
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this legislation, property was returned to former owners or their
heirs; or, where heirs did not exist, to the Claims Conference.
After the German reunification, this restitution was extended to Eastern Germany. You may remember that the East
German State did not accept any responsibility for what had happened in Germany before 1945.
On the compensation side, 4.4 million claims were filed
based on acts of racial and other Nazi persecution for damage to
health, liberty, and so on. About forty percent of recipients live
in Israel, ten percent in Germany, and the rest in other countries.
Today still, some DM 1.2 billion (U.S.$6.25 million) is paid
every year to about 100,000 pensioners. I did deliberately omit
hardship funds, global agreements with Western European nations, and Reconciliation Foundations in Eastern Europe set up
after 1990.
So I have to contradict the notion of forgotten victims. As
proof, the majority of people benefiting from our Foundation
"Remembrance, Responsibility, and the Future" had already received
payments out of German public funds.
The Foundation "Remembrance, Responsibility, and the Future,"
was set up under public German law, and is not, as some like to
see it, a kind of class action settlement. Half of its capital is German taxpayers' money. The other half is put up by the German
industry, by the business community, although to be precise,
these are tax deductible, so seventy-five percent of the DM 10.10
billion is paid by the taxpayers.
The original idea, compensation for forced and slave labor
for survivors in Eastern Germany, predates by far German
reunification. A project of the German Green Party, it started to
take political shape more than fifty years ago in the European
Parliament. It was introduced as a project of law at the German
Bundestagin June 1989 by the Greens and the Social Democrats,
then opposition parties, almost ten years before Mr. Melvin
Weiss filed the first class action suit against Ford Motor Company
in March 1998.
The Foundation "Remembrance, Responsibility, and the Future"
is not a predominantly Jewish enterprise. The bulk of the payments are directed to former non-Jewish forced workers, mostly
living in Eastern Europe. Nor will its most ambitious project, a
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DM 700 million endowment, called the "Responsibility and the
Future" Fund, be dedicated predominantly to Holocaust issues.
By the will of the German Bundestag, it will cover a much broader
field of projects, and I quote, "projects that serve the purposes of
better understanding among peoples, youth exchange, social justice, remembrance of the threat posed by totalitarian systems
and despotism, and international cooperation in humanitarian
endeavors."
Ladies and gentlemen, with the Foundation, which is
funded with DM 10 billion, and the Agreement on Lasting Legal
Peace, we have made an effort to draw a financial line under the
darkest chapter of our history-a financial line. It cannot be
and must not be a moral line. It is only if we understand this
that there can be a way out of the dark past into a bright future.
DR. FOGELMAN: Thank you, Count Lambsdorff.
Professor Elazar Barkan, who has written the superb book
The Guilt of Nations,2 raises many complex questions that we are
discussing today, and the answers are equally evocative.
I would like to ask you, Professor Barkan, Count Lambsdorff
seems to feel that there has been such a positive response to the
new restitution in Germany, and I wonder whether in your comments you can tell us do you see a new national identity among
the second and third generation Germans and is the restitution
process having any impact on that?
Also, you outlined a dilemma of restitution: How are we to
celebrate the proliferation of restitution as a new international
morality, or is it merely the latest twist in contemporary escapism
from moral responsibility? You also discuss that restitution may
also be viewed by critics as a cop-out, as an excuse not to deal
with the most horrendous catastrophe. Is that what the Germans
are doing today? Are other nations doing that-who are involved in the new initiatives of restitution?
PROFESSOR BARKAN: Good morning. Thank you.
Well, that's a lot in five minutes, but let me try.
I see my task here as doing more of a comparative analysisthere are many people here who are more expert than I am on
the particular German/Jewish issue. I think what I saw myself
2.

ELAZAR BARKAN, THE GUILT OF NATIONS:

ICAL INJUSTICES

(2000).

RESTITUTION AND NEGOTIATING HISTOR-
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doing is really widening the scope and making a couple of statements in general about the issue of restitution from a global perspective.
The first point is that we are talking about a relatively new
phenomenon: the issue of restitution. It is not that outrages,
atrocities, war crimes-say what you will, call it what you willhave not happened previously in history. It is not that restitution/reparations have not occurred previously in history. But up
to 1919, including the Versailles Treaty, it has always been-and
I challenge people to give me examples to the contrary-the
case of a victor's justice. The victors demanded restitution from
the losers, and there was no issue of voluntary recognition of
responsibility.
That has changed, as we have heard just a minute ago, first
after World War II, with the agreement between the Germans
and Israel.
The first point I want to make is that the phenomenon that
we are talking about involves the acknowledgment-the explicit
acknowledgment-by the perpetrators that they have done
wrong. Sometimes it includes an assumption that such an acknowledgment does amend; other times the assumption is that it
does not fully amend, but that it makes some gestures in the
direction of amending the past. But generally, the first point is
that it involves the issue of voluntary recognition.
By "voluntary," I do not mean that there is no pressure, but
there is a difference between pressure, political and otherwise,
and actually imposition. It is not an imposition. It is pressurea political constellation that leads to voluntary recognition by
the perpetrators.
The second point I would like to make is that after the 1952
Agreement, we have had a lull until the late-1980s when the
trend of restitution became really global and encompassed many
other groups around the world. I will not go through the list,
but I will just comment that I see this as broadly divided into two
parts: one part is cases that stem from World War II, which is
what I call post-war; and the other is cases that stem from the decolonization, or the post-colonial situation.
The post-colonial situation in this case primarily involves exBritish colonies, including the United States, whereby indige-

2001]

HOLOCAUST RESTITUTION INITIATIVES

S-153

nous people and people who have suffered under colonialism,
which is a much longer case, demand restitution and reparation.
That brings me to the next point, which is that I believe that
this restitution effort is very much a post-Cold War phenomenon
in its larger case-not the restitution of the specific 1952 Agreement, which was an important precedent, a unique precedent.
In the post-Cold War period, in a society that for shorthand I will
call "post-Colonial," a new perception of history emerged.
It is not objective history, but it is a malleable, subjective, or
inter-subjective history. What that means is that while we have a
larger frame, which we can agree upon, the specifics and the
particularities can only be agreed upon by the interlocutors, by
the protagonists of every particular case.
There are many different narratives or stories that you can
tell about particular cases. The restitution story, the restitution
narrative, in each particular conflict-the Holocaust is what I
would like to call a non-paradigmatic example of that, but it is
the most important one in that regard-brings the perpetrators
and their victims together in some forum in which they can tell
their history in a similar way. Their stories are not identical, but
they create enough of a common ground to actually be able to
understand each other and not to say "this is my history, this is
your history, and we cannot bridge those together."
As I have outlined in my book, there are many cases. In
each particular case, there are tremendous difficulties. We have
cases where there is no yardstick by which we can agree, or the
outsider can agree, that such a solution is right or such a compromise is wrong.
We are limited in the broader frame. So, for instance, obviously we cannot agree to a negotiated agreement whereby atrocities will remain and will continue. However, when there is a sum
of money-whether it's U.S.$10 billion or U.S.$1 billion-the
only yardstick to decide if that is the right amount is whether
both parties can agree upon that amount, given the political situation, given their willingness, given the contemporary suffering
of the victims, given the willingness of the perpetrators to recognize and acknowledge their responsibility. Then they can come
to some kind of an agreement. The acknowledgment is the most
important part.
The monetary side is, obviously, a way in which, we usually
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get to a compromise where it is financially significant for the
victims and it is not financially significant for the perpetrators. It
is not necessarily a cynical view, but that is how we make political
compromises.
For the Jews in 1952, the agreement with Germany was very
financially significant. For the Germans, it was meaningful but
not significant. It influenced somewhat the London discussions,
but it did not really deprive Germany of its ability to prosper
economically. It facilitated an economic improvement for Israel
and for the Jews.
So I think that in between those categories there is a very
large space to negotiate whether it will be millions, billions, a few
billions, or many billions. If you would like to talk about comparable post-colonial cases, I would be happy to make that comparison as well.
DR. FOGELMAN: If you don't mind, I will let you continue,
but I just want Professor Richard Weisberg, who has written Vichy
Law and the Holocaust in France,3 which has been an eye-opener
that dispels the myth that the French were not responsible for
the persecution of the Jews-the French have been notorious for
hiding behind the Vichy Government and their resistance movement.
I wonder, Professor Weisberg, the kind of acknowledgment
that Professor Barkan is talking about-how does that fit in today with France, and particularly the book that was published in
France, your book Vichy Law and the Holocaust in France, in 1998,
and what was the reaction to your findings that the French law
was responsible and that powerful lawyers and institutions were
responsible for deporting the 75,000 Jews from French soil to
their death camps?
PROFESSOR WEISBERG: Thank you very much, Dr. Fogelman.
I also want to join my fellow panelists in thanking the Law
School here at Fordham and also Thane Rosenbaum. I want to
thank Thane not only for organizing this conference, but also
for his own writings connected to this subject, which are both
inspirational and I think quite brilliant.
3.

RICHARD

H.

WEISBERG, VICHY LAW AND THE HOLOCAUST IN FRANCE

(1998).
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The question of France I think is especially interesting in a
way when we tackle the relationship of restitution and reconciliation. I want to take just a few minutes to track three time lines
for you that may be both informative and help us to continue a
conversation-and maybe a debate-about the relationship of
restitution and reconciliation.
In my view, just to get to my conclusion-with France being
the particular subject of my interest, although not exclusively so,
over the last couple of years-reconciliation and restitution are
not mutually exclusive. They are not antonyms. They can work
together.
I would also state my view at the outset that, although there
are significant complexities about relating any monetary award
or monetary restitution with an event as sacred as the Holocaust,
there are also symmetries between an attempt to bring a measure of individual justice. The only way at present that this is
possible may be through monetary restitution. There are symmetries between that attempt and preserving the memory of the
Holocaust and, more importantly, continuing to bring out the
truth of the Holocaust.
In this sense, the two hats that I have worn, that of historian
and that of litigator, sometimes merge and fit together on my
head. Litigation has helped us to continue work that began in
the archives with documentation to uncover what actually happened.
As much as has been written about and talked about the
Holocaust, particularly over the last ten to twelve years, we still,
in my view, only know about forty percent of the factual data
connected to that sad event. Litigation plays a role, indeed, in
uncovering further historical truths.
So on the level of truth, on the level of reconciliation, on
the level of morality, it seems to me that these conflicting approaches-historical research on the one hand, litigation on the
other-are actually grayer. They merge and they have elements
in common.
The time lines that I briefly want to describe are as follows.
One relates to the uncovering of historical material about
Vichy France itself, and there are analogues I think in almost
every other country in Hitler's Europe. I started research on my
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book in 1982, and at that particular time it was almost impossible
to get into French archives connected to the sad period of Vichy.
There had been very little written about it. The most notable book was by two North Americans, Marrus and Paxton, a
book you should read if you haven't already, called Vichy France
and the Jews.4 There were some wonderful books that had been
written shortly after the war by Jewish historians, like Joseph Billig. These works are still very important, and they were important to me. They were not that easy to find. For the most part,
you could find them in this wonderful documentary center, the
Centre de DocumentationJuive Contemporaine,which is still around.
You should visit it when you go to Paris, if you're not familiar
with it. It was the only archival center open in 1982 to people
trying to find out what happened during the war years.
Between 1982 and 1994-and this is a much longer storythe archives opened up, at least to some extent, the French National Archives, in particular, and I was able to get into boxes of
documents that clearly had not been opened since they were put
in there some forty years before.
My book came out in 1996 and was translated into French in
1998. During all that time I was interrelating with the French,
interviewing them, and also receiving quite a bit of support from
French historians as to my own work.
I think over that period of time there was a certain reconciliation, if I can use that word, on the level of historical truth finding among the French, because at the beginning of my enterprise in 1982 very few French thought that the idea of uncovering what happened during Vichy was a good idea, and most
people tried to dissuade me and the few others who were doing
this from doing it at all.
By the end of the period, there was support. There were
debates and lectures at the Sorbonne. The area had opened up
considerably. Anyone who goes to FNAC or Gibern or any other
major bookstore in France will see now two or three bookshelves
worth of material, some of it quite excellent, on the story of
Vichy.
So we have, as far as documentation during those fifteen
years a kind of reconciliation, at least in the historical commu4.
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nity, reconciliation too to the finding that the French were themselves responsible for the almost 200 laws that were promulgated
during Vichy against the Jews, that anti-Semitism on a legalistic
level was a cottage industry, a huge industry, among French lawyers, judges, law professors, private attorneys, et cetera, during
that period, and that much of it was done without any German
pressure. Eventually, indeed, the Germans were delighted to see
the French fully involved in their own brand of anti-Semitism,
because it saved the Germans significant political costs, manpower, and treasury by letting the French do it themselves-and
they did it themselves; 75,000 Jews were deported from France,
mostly under the color of French law.
The second time line is a litigation time line. A year after
my book came out, lawyers who were engaged in the Swiss Bank
case asked me to participate, and I also became involved in what
were first called the insurance company cases. These were cases
brought in American courts, as most of you know, against various European private institutions, banks and insurance companies at the beginning.
Those institutions had not been cooperative with individuals who had tried to resolve the fact that they were owed money
on life insurance policies, people who died in Auschwitz and
elsewhere, or who tried to go to their local banks and to get the
banks to disgorge moneys that had been deposited in those
banks. They were treated with coldness, indifference, and most
of you know the stories now-an almost astounding sense of unawareness, deliberate unawareness, of what it was to die in a
camp and how impossible documentation was under those circumstances.
It was for these reasons-these individual clients-that
these lawsuits began. We had no idea at the time what the reaction of American courts of justice would be to this litigation.
I became involved, asked by several superb lawyers who are
in this room, a year or two later in a case against the French
banks. Here I want to again briefly bridge the gap between restitution and reconciliation, because the story of the French Bank
case is a story of both. It is a story of restitution to individual
clients. It is a story of reconciliation among plaintiffs' lawyers,
the French banks, and the French Government itself, which has
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significantly changed its attitude about the lawsuit and about the
notion of individual restitution over the last two years.
The Dray Commission has been established, and under the
agreements of January 2001, which Stuart Eizenstat and Ambassador Andreani of France masterfully negotiated between the
plaintiffs, the banks, and the two governments, an agreement
has been reached which vests in the Dray Commission the responsibility for providing individual restitution with some oversight by the plaintiffs' lawyers and others as to whether they are
doing that job.
And they are doing the job now. Whereas two years ago the
notion in France that individual restitution would be a way of
resolving the memory and history of the Holocaust was anathema, it was something they didn't believe in and they deeply resented, they are now participating. I can tell you, since I do not
deal with them any longer on an adversarial or litigation level,
but on an ambassadorial level, that there is great good faith now
in terms of a process that originally they resented and they felt
was being thrust upon them.
Meanwhile, and more importantly, individuals are finally beginning to receive from the banks a measure of justice. Of
course, money is nothing to these victims or their descendants
compared to the personal horrors of their lives, but money and
the fact that their stories are heard and recognized, first by
courts of American justice, now by the French commissions,
these are significant elements when you speak to our clients.
These are the significant elements that are important there.
The third time line has to do with France itself. Here, in
line with earlier speakers, I agree that acknowledgment of
wrongdoing is terribly important. In 1995, Chirac for the first
time acknowledged for France its responsibility, reversing decades of a mythology of resistance or absence that Charles de
Gaulle set in motion after the war. This was terribly important.
But it took six more years of struggle for that acknowledgment to translate itself into individual justice, where the actual
specific victims of French wrongdoing received a measure ofjustice, however small.
Thank you.
DR. FOGELMAN: Thank you, Professor Weisberg.
I would like to bring Professor Vivian Grosswald Curran into
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the conversation. She is a prolific writer on the demise of democracy in Vichy France and also Nazi Germany.
I wonder, Professor Curran, whether you see the same kinds
of turning points and shifts as a nation from going from denial
to acknowledging the moral dimension of the apology in France.
PROFESSOR CURRAN: Thank you very much.
I would also like to thank Professor Rosenbaum for inviting
me here.
My comments are going to focus on what is suggested by the
title of this conference, "Reconciling Moral Imperatives with Legal Initiatives." I think what we have here is the suggestion of a
dilemma-namely, that although there are legally cognizable viable claims, there also is much more, and in that much more are
considerations that somehow have to be reconciled with recourse in and through law.
First, it should be perfectly clear that there are legally legitimate claims here. With respect to the property claims, not only
was there theft and robbery, which are crimes under the laws of
every nation involved-consequent unjust enrichment-but also
this was a crime of such massive proportions that one legal
scholar felt the need to coin a new term. He calls it "thefticide."
But this theft, this thefticide, the stealing ofJewish property,
was not just an act forbidden as a violation of both normative
and statutory law relating to property ownership.
First of all, one of the distinctive features of this theft was
that it was also legalized. It had a dual-a binary-nature of simultaneous legality and illegality. It was cloaked in the habit of
legality when committed because of the mimicry of law that was
Nazi law and Vichy French law, and undoubtedly the law of some
other places, as well as through the theoretical foundations laid
by the Nazi legal theorists of the day, people like Schmitt,
Larenz, Maunz, and others, who constructed a theoretical basis
in law for genocide.
But it simultaneously was illegal through the unchanged
laws, which are still on the books from the pre-war era that never
decriminalized theft. As some of you may know, in Germany
Hitler seriously considered repealing the entire German Civil
Code, the BGB, but he didn't, and Petain in France also did not
repeal the French Codes.
Even more significantly, however, this theft, this thefticide,
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was not an isolated infraction of property law because it also was
part and parcel of mass murder. It was woven into the fabric of
genocide. It was a facet, a feature, of genocide, a prelude to it in
some circumstances, a consequence of it in others, and this is
true without exception for all of the theft we are discussing in
these cases.
So the legal violations of which we are speaking remain inseparable from genocide. And consequently, the dilemma
which arises from this when we speak of moral imperatives is
whether law is the right instrument for this subject.
A first order of problems arising under this dilemma has to
do with what Isaiah Berlin called attention to throughout his life.
This is the problem of clashing systems of thought, the tendency
that we have to compare incommensurables.
A second order of problems is the role of the symbolic, of
meanings, of significances. Within this order of problems lie issues of erasure and suppression of language and silence. One
thinks of the terrible weight of silence of those who have died,
the silence, which we try to interpret. Language is, after all, the
symbolic system through which we think, mean, and through
which we hide meaning, all of which have played a great role in
the history of the Holocaust at many different levels.
For more on this issue I refer you to the written materials of
mine that are in the distributed materials.
With respect to the issue of incommensurables, we see two
domains encountering each other that are different and yet that
intersect. We have law. We have legal actions brought in U.S.
courts against entities of other nations, complaints in civil-that
means non-criminal-law, the ultra-modern, ultra-American
procedural device of the class action lawsuits, and suits half a
century after the events that transpired.
Law has its own categories and grids, its own cognitive
processes for absorbing data, and, especially in the United
States, its own criteria for admitting or rejecting evidence. From
this process the law creates a version of facts that the court record constitutes, concretizes, and sanctifies as truth, for it becomes legal truth, it becomes a set of axioms that are deemed
the universe of true facts, the narrative of the past that is invulnerable.
The court's decision may be reversed on appeal, but unless

2001]

HOLOCAUST RESTITUTION INITIATIVES

S-161

a case is remanded for a new trial, the trial court records remain
the unassailable narrative of past events, fixed, frozen, immutable, at least until future case law revises it in the interpretive process which we lawyers call stare decisis.
The very justice courts hope to generate is a function of the
system which produces it, and the legal system does not aspire to
reflect history beyond the legal issues of each pending case. It is
not equipped to address genocide, to create monuments to
memory, to recollect in the sense that Ernst Cassirer speaks of
memory and history as re-collections, a process that one also sees
so beautifully in the novel of Marcel Proust, Remembrance of
Things Past.5
Goods and evils are ascertainable and explicable from
within systems, but not necessarily across them. How does U.S.
civil class action law intersect with the Holocaust? Law can grant
financial remedy to compensate for stolen property. But law
sends the message, whether intentional or not, that justice has
been done. But is it justice in these cases, or, rather, are we not
speaking of two very different sorts of justices? Do pennies per
day suffered in Auschwitz or Treblinka constitute justice? Will
the Holocaust now be deemed shelvable and forgettable because
allegedly legally remedied?
In the clash of the different domains involved here, we need
to remember that law is perceived as resolving injustice where it
speaks, and that, in part, is because its self-understanding and its
projection is ofjustice generation. If the courts mandate money
as the legal remedy with many tens of millions of dollars reserved
for the attorneys, would this be what the victims would have advised us to seek? Have the six million been vindicated or betrayed?
Yet, if some elderly survivors now can live in less financial
distress and with better health care than before, is that not a
worthy result? And do those who were robbed not deserve financial compensation like anyone else in the civilized world?
The problem is that it is both justice and not justice, depending on which frame of reference we use, such that, as Isaiah
Berlin warned us, our widespread conviction that all things good
are mutually reconcilable is both illogical, and even incoherent.
5. MARCEL PROUST, REMEMBRANCE
Terence Kilmartin) (1981).

OF THINGS PAST

(trans. C.K. Scott Moncrieff &
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Let me end with a 1946 comment of the French Committee
of Writers, the Committee Nacional d'Ecrivans, which had been an
anti-Nazi group from the beginning. They wrote about collaborationist writers who were executed in the purge trials which immediately followed the Liberation known as the Epuration which
were extremely harsh, and they wrote then of collaborators who
had been executed, that they had not paid enough, and they
said: "Those people paid only in the eyes of justice, but not in
the least in the eyes of human conscience."
Because the court verdict is defined from within its own system as constituting justice, many will equate Holocaust restitution settlements and court verdicts with the verdict of human
conscience. And if this equation is invalid because the cases necessarily are limited to legally cognizable issues, and therefore do
not satisfy the larger dimension of human conscience that this
writers' group was evoking, but if we believe that it is precisely
the domain of human conscience that is and must remain the
point of reference with respect to the Holocaust, then can we
reconcile the moral imperatives with the legal initiatives?
Thank you.
DR. FOGELMAN: Thank you, Professor Curran.
We see that we have come a long way in this third generation on acknowledging the persecution. The moral complexities
are a field that I would like to get a more global view on from
Professor Barkan, and if you can also address if you see the way
that Professor Curran sees that the legal road is not the way to
deal with the moral complexities, and in what other dimensions
can victims get justice, and is it possible to get any kind of justice?
PROFESSOR BARKAN: It seems to me that in the comments the panelists expressed a contradiction between lawsuits
and memory, as though restitution leads to forgetting, because
once we have restitution, supposedly it is a closed case, and that
actually leads to some kind of forgetting.
I think actually that the contrary is the situation, that restitution actually enhances the memory. Restitution and acknowledgment are steps, are components, of memory. It is not in contradiction to memory. It is not that we say, "Okay, so we have
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reached an agreement and therefore we can sort of put it behind us."
On the contrary, we say "we have reached an agreement,
and from this we step further. We have more memory. We have
more memory that we can build upon, that recognizes the victims."
So I think that the legal and the moral are not at all contradictory. On the contrary, when we can get some legal resolution,
it enhances the moral historical notion of memory and validation of the victims.
Having said that, perhaps I should add that it is very difficult
to think of a global moral yardstick. I will give you just a very
brief example.
Let's think with regard to the post-World War. You have the
case, for instance, of, relatively speaking, guilty bystanders. During all the atrocities that happened during World War II, the
Swiss were clearly not the ones who were at the forefront, so
they, at least at the time, were viewed more as bystanders. Yet,
today, and certainly after the agreement, we see this as the notion of the guilty bystanders.
On the other hand, you have the notions of innocent perpetrators. Nobody thinks of the Soviet occupation of Germany as
lacking in perpetration of war crimes. There is no lack of that.
Yet, when the negotiations between Germany and the Soviet
Union actually came, it was clear that there were much more
profound perpetrations than even the perpetrations of the
crimes in 1944 and 1945. They were done in a particular context and, therefore, you have what I call innocent perpetrators.
And then you have the guilty victims, which is another category. Think of the Sudetendeutsche, the ethnic Germans from
Eastern Europe, from Poland, who were what we would call today ethnically cleansed at the end of the war. Clearly, there were
millions who suffered who could not under any circumstances
be conceived as perpetrators, yet they are not on the top of our
list of compassion. They are not on the top of the list of those
whose suffering has to be amended.
I am not saying that those issues have to be reversed, but I
just want to show that in each case when you address it, there are
greater moral complexities, and the pragmatic notion is not just
the actual case that happens, but also the context. In this con-
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text, the German recognition of its own role in the perpetration
of the Holocaust includes also the ability of not being able to
recognize, or giving up the recognition of, the suffering of the
German people in different categories because it is overshadowed by other things.
So moral judgment is very complex. We are able to segment
it or to parcel it into some components of legal adjudication and
we address those that we can, we do not address those that we
cannot. But all together we create a memory that is much more
complex, it is non-linear, and it is actually increased by the discussion, it is not diminished with the closure of some kind of a
case.

DR. FOGELMAN: Thank you.
Professor Weisberg would like to comment.
PROFESSOR WEISBERG: Yes. I agree with much of what
Professor Barkan just said about the possibilities inherent in litigation to reinforce and add to memory, rather than to restrict or
bring a violent kind of closure to the memory of the Holocaust.
I did not read my friend and colleague Vivian Curran really
as saying something that different, but I would be interested in
hearing her. I think what she is trying to say is that there clearly
are differences between the pathway to truth in litigation and
also the memorialization of truth in a legal opinion and what we
usually associate with history and other means to the memory of
the Holocaust.
But what I want to say about that is the following. Most of
the Holocaust lawsuits that I have been involved with can be described more as a process than as a bringing of closure through a
judicial opinion to specific adversarial claims that have been
made.
The litigation has involved significant decisions. I would
note Judge Sterling Johnson's magisterial decision in the Eastern
District of New York in the French Banks case in August of 2000,
denying in every respect the defendant banks' motions to dismiss. This was significant both as a document which was very
sensitive to the history of the Holocaust and as a legal moment
in the case, because until then most of the banks were reluctant
to even discuss with us the possibility of reconciliation, which in
law talk is usually called negotiation and settlement.
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But many of the cases never had a significant decision by a
judge. That includes the Swiss Banks case. It is not that the
judge was not important. He was important in some ways in precisely not rendering a decision and in waiting for events that involved political reconciliation among various parties and many,
many other complexities to take place.
So sometimes silence, which we usually do not associate with
courts and lawyers, silence or a refusal to act to bring closure has
been as important in the Holocaust cases as specific decisions
with their perhaps too closed or constricted notions of memory.
Lawrence Langer has written quite a bit about the problems
that arise when we think about litigation and courtrooms and
decisions in connection with memory generally, and those exist.
But in the Holocaust cases, I think there has been some very
interesting, again, reconciliation of means to an end of truthseeking that we do not usually put together in the same breath.
DR. FOGELMAN: Let me ask you, Professor Curran, do
you think that the class action suits defeat the memory of the
dead, thus impeding mourning rather than facilitating the process?
PROFESSOR CURRAN: Well, first, let me say that I do
agree with Professor Weisberg's comments and also with the previous speaker's, in the sense that the ideal would be for this to be
a process not of diminishing returns but of opening to further
thinking and memorialization.
One of the problems with the use of law, I believe, is that
law does pose as closure. Law symbolizes that on one level, and
is likely to be interpreted in that manner, as allowing for remedies and finalizing a problem.
With respect to the class action lawsuit, one can immediately
see why one needs it, what the advantages are. But the phenomenon itself also poses particular problems in the context of the
Holocaust, in my view.
One of the hallmarks of Nazism and of the experience in
the concentration camp was the utter and complete de-individualization of human beings. This de-individualization, which was
one of the most horrific aspects of the entire Holocaust, is in
some sinister way reproduced in the phenomenon of the class
action suit, despite its good intentions, in the sense that: What is
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a class action suit? It is a lumping together. One plaintiff, two
plaintiffs, five plaintiffs represent thousands or millions. And
who are those thousands or millions? They once again become
faceless and de-individualized.
I do not just say that in the abstract. I am in a Holocaust
Internet discussion group which has many members who are
themselves survivors, and one of the comments that I have seen
with some frequency is a bitter comment that, "No one asked if
they could represent me. I didn't empower anyone to speak for
me." This, I think, is a problem that is peculiarly tragic in this
particular context of all contexts.
I also happen to believe that there are major problems with
class action lawsuits in American law on other levels, but I think
that this is one of the particular problems here.
Maybe I could just add one more word. I went back and
forth innumerable times on the issue of these lawsuits, and I did
end up agreeing to be an expert on behalf of the plaintiffs. But I
would like to tell you why.
When I saw what the motions to dismiss were from these
French banks and that the greatest legal scholars in France
claimed there was no such thing as unjust enrichment because
the French Civil Code doesn't actually say that, which is such
baloney. It reminded me that this is what law was like in the
Vichy period that my parents lived through, and I thought, "I
can't just not let this be answered."
So in the end, I have very mixed feelings about this, but I do
not feel completely at peace with it either.
DR. FOGELMAN: Professor Weisberg?
PROFESSOR WEISBERG: I am pleased that Professor Curran perceived that some of the defenses that were raised were
baloney.
I would characterize her association of a class action suit
with the depersonalization of Jews that took place during the
Holocaust as a form of-I would just call it-kosher salami. You
cannot put those two things together in the same sentence.
It is true that there are aspects of the class action suit that, I
guess in a kind of strange way of reasoning, have representatives
stepping forward. But to say that that produces depersonalization at all in the other litigants is not true either to my experi-
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ence of dealing with hundreds of people, whether they are
named or not named, all of whom, at least in our situation, were
absolutely-I would say you cannot describe the word. "Delighted" is the wrong word.
But the chance to participate in receiving recognition of
these terrible events from adjudicators, decision-makers, and
even eventually from the country that perpetrated the event, was
precious to these people.
It's true that some of the fits and starts of a class action litigation are difficult, just like any other litigation. Clients are very
rarely in any litigation totally thrilled with what their lawyers are
doing at all times. There is some mystification about how the
law works. I do not think there is anything special about Holocaust litigation in that respect.
I think it is simply wrong to equate what is a resolution of
the horrors of the Holocaust in the same breath with the victimization of people, the depersonalization during the Holocaust of
those individuals.
DR. FOGELMAN: Count Lambsdorff, I wonder whether
you could tell us a cynical view that exists, that restitution is a
device so that the rich and powerful who have perpetrated
crimes in the past can establish their moral virtue by using resources to buy ajust and ethical past. Is that something that you
have heard, this kind of criticism about what Germany has been
trying to do in the new restitution initiatives?
DR. GRAF LAMBSDORFF: Allow me to make a few remarks
on what I have heard here.
I find it difficult to understand why the class action lawsuits
lead to depersonalization. Looking to the German Foundation,
the result is that we do pay money to individuals, to persons. Of
course, it starts with a number of plaintiffs, a class, but at the very
end the result of these class action lawsuits, or negotiations-I
come back to why I make this distinction-is giving money to
individual people. These are persons, and they are certainly not
depersonalized.
Second, I would underline Professor Barkan's remark that
restitution enhances the memory. That is certainly our experience. During these negotiations, which as you know took more
than two years, the debate, the memory, the dealing with Holo-
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caust affairs in Germany became more and more lively. Companies are looking into their archives. Companies have asked academics, professors, to write reports, to find out what has happened within the companies. So we have certainly seen that the
restitution debate has fueled the reconciliation debate. There is
no doubt about that.
But one thing should be said too. Class action lawsuits have
been filed against German companies. Not one company has
lost one law case, not one. The moral responsibility was of
course, on the government and political side the most important
motivation-but there were two very practical or pragmatic approaches.
First, the companies against whom the class action lawsuits
were filed wanted to try to avoid all the public noise which goes
along with class action lawsuits and which would damage their
business in the American market-very clear business interest.
Second, the German Government wanted to avoid the damage, which would have happened to German-American relations
by these class action lawsuits.
In our Foundation negotiations, morality, and business
came very close to each other. That has to be said and it has to
be seen. I have always said that this was the basis on which we
negotiated. We did not want a class action settlement. We
could, of course, not expect a law passed by the American Congress-and that is why we used the way of the Statement of Interest, which I cannot explain here, but which was the way out of
the dilemma we had.
A class action settlement would have meant, of course, first
for us to admit that there is a legally based claim, which never
has happened; and second, we would have all the publicity
which goes along with such a procedure.
What Professor Weisberg said about the situation in France:
We are the last ones who can point to other countries on these
issues. But it is not only France, Professor Weisberg. Our European neighbors suddenly experience a debate on what they have
done, what their people have done, to assist the mass murder
during the Nazi period. It is very difficult for them. We see that
and we feel that.
You have mentioned President Chirac. He certainly was a
courageous exception in France. But look to other countries as
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well, which had nothing to do with the Holocaust. See what happened or did not happen in Japan, for instance.
And finally, Professor Barkan mentioned voluntary recognition and voluntary restitution, and you added that a little bit of
pressure was behind it. That is exactly true. Of course it is true.
There was, from the German Government and from the German
political forces, the recognition we have for our responsibility,
not our guilt. Guilt is something which is individual. My children have no guilt, but my children have a responsibility for
what has happened in German history and by Germans, and we
have to live with that. Not with personal guilt-I cannot find
that. That point is very important. Voluntary recognition and
restitution, yes, but again, as you said, with pressure.
And finally, I have heard some remarks here that the monetary aspect of restitution is not so important. It was the most
difficult task during our negotiations to find an amount of
money: Is 10 billion enough? Is 5 billion enough? Do we need
50 billion? When we started this, it was between DM 1.5 billion
and U.S.$23 billion. That was the gap we had to overcome, we
had to bridge.
If I buy a house, I offer this price, and if it is not enough, I
give you some more or say no.
But here: a price? We knew how difficult that was. The
other side and I were absolutely relieved and delighted that all
the people around the table came to a result. Whether this is a
just result or an unjust result, nobody can say that. I do not
know it.
But to say that money is not so important, do not take it too
lightly in New York, in the United States. To a survivor who is
living here in, hopefully, well-to-do or reasonably satisfactory
conditions, DM 15,000 is not that much. For a survivor in the
Ukraine or Belarus, it is a fortune. What they receive now in
their old days is a fortune for them. So there are different aspects from different sides. It depends under which conditions
you are living.
Therefore, I would like to stress that certainly money cannot
compensate for people who have been killed, people who have
been in a concentration camp, people who have been forced to
work in Germany, but it can help at least those people who are
in need and can really make the last few years of their life better.
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Thank you.
DR. FOGELMAN: We appreciate your honesty, Count
Lambsdorff, particularly the fact that the debates around the restitution in Germany, its political significance has been heightened, as you say, by getting other nations to talk about their role
in the persecution of Jews.
I am wondering, Professor Barkan, is there anything you
would like to add to the monetary debates, on how that enhances or diminishes the moral motivation and the moral responsibility of restitution?
PROFESSOR BARKAN: Thank you.
I think that it clearly enhances it-there is no doubt. But
when I referred to it, I was not so much referring to your comments in terms of the class action suits, but actually to the whole
issue of restitution, going back to 1952 and the almost-revolutionary opposition in Israel to "blood money" must be
remembered. The issue that restitution or reparation is "blood
money," that it white-washes, has been crucial to our understanding of whether restitution is moral or not moral, whether you are
contaminated by getting restitution and reparation. I think that
has to be remembered, that-even in the limited spectrum
within which we agree or disagree at the moment-it is very limited compared to the whole spectrum of whether there ought to
be any reparation, that it is sacrilege.
But I think the other very important aspect to restitution is
that one should never be satisfied with it. That is a constitutive
element of restitution. It is not that restitution is agreed upon
and therefore everybody goes home having reached an agreement. Part of the agreement is to emphasize that it is not satisfactory. The issue is that you have the aspiration that you talked
about in terms of class actions. The aspirations are there. One
has to have the recognition, the personal recognition, and if
one's story is not being told, then one really feels violated again.
I have more than full sympathy for that.
But this is part of the nature of the restitution. The alternative is not a different, better restitution. The alternative is no
restitution. That was a very real alternative in 1952. That is a
very real alternative to many people in the world today who
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don't get to the table to give their violations of the past, the
crimes against them being negotiated in such a way.
So having said that, money is very important, but so is the
lack of closure.
DR. FOGELMAN: With that, I would like to continue to ask
a question. We see that one of the important elements is to prevent guilt, as Count Lambsdorff is saying-that the victims are
not interested in second and third generation feeling guilty
about what happened. After all, they were not responsible. But
I think that, as survivors, as children of survivors, we expect the
second, the third, the fourth generations to feel a sense of moral
responsibility.
If there are new disclosures ten years from now, should
these restitutions be able to be revived yet again? Should there
be some kind of a statute of limitations? I would like to raise this
to Count Lambsdorff and to the other panelists.
DR. GRAF LAMBSDORFF: Well, legally speaking, the statute of limitations, of course, does exist. That is one of the reasons I said to you that a lawsuit has never been won against one
of the German corporations, not in Germany and not in the
United States. Two are still on appeal in the United States, but
all the others have been dismissed, however, of course, in the
combined framework of the negotiations of the Foundation and
the combined Statement of Interest.
Therefore, as I said, all of us tried to bring a financial closure, to what has happened, not a moral closure. That can never
be and should never be. It will not happen.
PROFESSOR CURRAN: I would just like to add to this dilemma of the role of money in these cases. When Elie Wiesel
has been asked this kind of question, he always says, first of all,
that he never speaks in the name of anyone who died. He does
not feel he has the right to. He, of all people, feels he has no
right to do that. The one thing he sought was to have the German Bundestag say they were sorry. That is how he saw the appropriate restitution.
PROFESSOR BARKAN: Just a word about the issue of the
statute of limitations. I think clearly the question of restitution,
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as we understand and discuss it here, goes beyond the statute of
limitations.
The whole issue of historical crime, as opposed to contemporary crime, is that it tries to address crimes that have long
passed, that in some way are beyond being addressed in an ordinary way in a legal forum, and therefore we go beyond the ordinary statute of limitations.
There you have special legislation. It is more equivalent to
the whole field that is developing of transitional justice, where
you try to address issues that cannot be addressed in an ordinary
forum, either because of its magnitude or because of duration or
otherwise.
But having said that, I do not know whether those aspects
that have not been addressed by the current litigation or nonlitigation agreement would be able to come up, but probably
they would. The issue is really the political resolution and the
political agreement between both parties.
And when I emphasize the issue of voluntary recognition, I
want to speak about what we think is voluntary about it. It is
really the example of the alternative way with Japan. Japan refused altogether, even today, to take the offer, so although the
statute of limitations may have been reached, Japan still has to
come to terms for its own crimes. Whether it will or not depends
on its own willingness to embark on such a method.
PROFESSOR CURRAN: The statue of limitations, in itself, I
think brings up one of the problems of law's involvement in this
area. The statute of limitations is a very fundamental legal notion, so that defendants, after a certain amount of time, are not
expected to keep documents, the witnesses die, and this whole
problem is really exacerbated here.
Now, what the French did is they made the crime against
humanity what they called imprescriptible, which means not subject to a statute of limitations. One of the things we have seen in
recent years in France in the trial of Papon, among others, which
uses all sorts of convoluted efforts to argue that things are crimes
against humanity, which do not necessarily fit the legal concept
of a crime against humanity precisely because everything else
would be barred under statutes of limitations.
DR. FOGELMAN: Professor Weisberg.

2001]

HOLOCAUST RESTITUTION INITIATIVES

S-173

PROFESSOR WEISBERG: Just one technical point. The
cases that were thrown out against the German companies by
district courts in New Jersey were not thrown out for statute of
limitations reasons. I was not involved in those cases, but as I
understand them, they were thrown out because of treaty relationships that the federal court deemed barred the actions.
Statute of limitations is the first thing that comes to mind
when you think about a possible bar to litigation of this kind, but
in general the courts in the United States have not been open to
or persuaded by that particular defense.
DR. FOGELMAN:
something.

Count Lambsdorff, you wanted to add

DR. GRAF LAMBSDORFF: Just in relation to what Professor Weisberg had said, the decisions by Judge Bassler and Judge
Mukasey in New Jersey and New York came as a result of our
negotiations, so they did not reach the point where the court
had to think about the statute of limitations.
PROFESSOR WEISBERG: In New York.
DR. GRAF LAMBSDORFF: Both in New Jersey as in New
York. And the same was true with Judge Kram. I would find it
difficult to see that any court could push that aside. However,
we do not want court procedures. That is the whole intention of
what we negotiated, what we did. I hope we can avoid it.
Professor Curran, you just mentioned that the survivors, the
victims expect a declaration or resolution of apology from the
German Bundestag. Now, the Bundestag has said that several
times over the last years, and the Bundestag has passed the law to
set up the Foundation almost unanimously. What I quoted here
was the President, President Rau, and he is the head of State. If
the head of State has declared this apology, I think it would not
add-perhaps even to the contrary-if the Bundestag were to
take a second resolution. If the President of the Republic gives
this statement, Roma locuta, causafinita.
DR. FOGELMAN: It seems to me that the governments
have taken on the moral responsibility as a nation, because the
perpetrators themselves, all the trials that took place-the Nuremberg trials, other trials that took place, the interviews that
took place with Nazi doctors by RobertJ. Lifton-I do not think
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we have one perpetrator on record who has apologized for the
crimes against the Jews. They all felt that they were doing the
right thing. I think this is part of the reason why the debate and
the need for the Holocaust survivors to continue to get some
kind of an apology continues, because from the real perpetrators
they will never get it.
DR. GRAF LAMBSDORFF: I would just like to underline
that in the criminal cases, the German Bundestag has removed
the statute of limitations. Criminal cases related to the Holocaust, no statute of limitations. What we were talking about
before were civil cases, civil lawsuits.
DR. FOGELMAN: I would like to talk about the reverse.
Now that the passage of time has gone by, do you feel that these
conversations as a result have become easier to have in France,
in Germany?
PROFESSOR WEISBERG: The conversation is a difficult
one because the memory that the conversation is based on is a
sacred memory to some, a memory that others still want to avoid.
But I do think that it is possible now to have a conversation,
whereas fairly recently-twenty years ago, fifteen years ago-it
was difficult to engage people at all, even well-meaning people,
in a discussion of this very dark period in their own histories.
And that is true in the United States too from time to time,
and it is true in a way in the United States even about the period
that we are talking of today. It is difficult to come to grips with
one's own wrongdoing, either individually or nationally.
But I think conversations go on. It is clear from people on
this panel that there are still rather serious differences of opinion about various things. But what certainly has occurred-and
I think there are a variety of reasons why this happened, including the passing of time, the passing of the torch to newer generations in Europe, and the historical work and litigation-it seems
to me we are now in a position where people are talking to each
other across the divide, and a measure of reconciliation as well
as restitution is taking place.
DR. GRAF LAMBSDORFF: I do not like to call the possibility-and I agree it is very possible-of a conversation easy or easier. These conversations never have been easy and they cannot
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be easy, and so therefore they cannot be easier. They are possible. They are necessary. There is more openness now. That is
all correct.
But I have met a concentration camp inmate in Denmark,
and he said, "I don't want your money. I am not ready to accept
it," for obvious reasons, which he explained. I had to respect
that. Others do not react in the same way. But there are very
different reactions to what we are doing, and that is understandable and cannot be discussed in the sense of being questioned
from all sides, certainly not.
PROFESSOR CURRAN: The nature of the conversation
also has changed in certain places because of the passage of
time. In France, in particular, the relation of the executive
branch to the judicial branch was such that essentially the trial of
French collaborators was avoided and delayed and delayed, and
the hope was essentially that they would all die before they had
to be brought to trial.
But what happened was that a new generation was so intent
on understanding the nature of Vichy: Was Vichy French? Was
Vichy a puppet government of the Germans? What was it? So
that, eventually, you had a conversation whose forum was the
judiciary, which again was not always well equipped to address
the questions that the nation needed to have answers to, but certainly the conversation broke through almost this surface of silence that had existed for so long.
DR. GRAF LAMBSDORFF: I just think the point is that
whichever way we discuss it, there is a greater legitimacy to discuss those issues, both because of the passage of time and because of the world political situation and the legitimacy of other
nations doing so. So there is a global movement.
This is the main cause, the restitution for Holocaust survivors, but it is one of the other causes, where the fact that the
Committee discussed forty-three countries' responsibilities, various shades of guilt, various shades of responsibility, the issues of
indigenous peoples, the descendants of slaves-all of those questions are becoming part of the conversation by which countries
are more willing to discuss their own complicity and responsibility for past injustices.
DR. FOGELMAN: Some people have a much more cynical
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view and are saying that the conversations now about the new
restitutions are to avoid current situations of genocide. Does anyone have any thoughts on that?
PROFESSOR BARKAN: I think that it is true. I think that it
is always possible. I think the important issue is to turn the question around and ask: If we weren't talking about restitution,
would we deal with the contemporary genocides? There is no
doubt that the cynical component is there.
But what I have found-and I have surveyed across the
world about this issue-is that those who emphasize the cynicism
are those who are the candidates to be criticized when these
questions are being raised. The descendants of victims, wherever the case is, hardly ever minimize the importance of the conversation; they hardly ever point to the cynical aspect.
If you look at the post-colonial aspect of it, usually the Conservative British press is very eager to talk about how cynical and
unimportant it is and how it is a victim culture, et cetera. But for
the victims, any recognition of their suffering is usually embraced rather than looked at from a cynical perspective.
So it is not only the claim of cynicism, but it is also important for us to look at who is bringing forth the claim of cynicism
and who is actually embracing the discussion of historical injustices.
DR. FOGELMAN: I would like to thank our panelists this
morning for opening up the conversation, for being honest,
and, most importantly, for their lives' dedication to the work
that they are doing, which ultimately has a tremendous healing
effect on the victims of the Holocaust. Thank you very much.
PROFESSOR ROSENBAUM: Thank you all, and thank you
Eva and the rest of the panelists.

